Skills
An agent gains its abilities by installing add-ons from open sources nobody checks. That is a live attack surface: instructions hidden inside a tool description that hijack the agent, a price checker that quietly reads your keys, a clean first version followed by a poisoned second one. One bad add-on empties the wallet, and the agent does it to itself.
So an auditor puts money down, reads a build, is paid when the verdict stands, and loses the money when it does not. Below, every add-on carries what is actually known about it, and five of the seven states are ways of not knowing.
Curated examples. The registry answered, and it holds nothing that matches.
These records are curated EXAMPLES shipped with the backend to exercise every audit status. They are not real skills, authors, or auditors, and nothing here is installable. Every example carries example: true and an id prefixed with 'example-'. Every record below carries an example tag and an id beginning example-. Nothing here is installable, and no author or auditor named below is a real one.
MCP server · v3.2.2 · Fugugent example author
An auditor examined this exact build, found it clean, and we hold the report.
Declares: Returns the USD price of a token from a public price API. Network access is limited to that one host; it holds no keys and signs nothing.
MCP server · v2.4.0 · Fugugent example author
An auditor examined this exact build and found it dangerous. Do not install it.
Intake scan: 1 hit in the declared text, worst critical. A scan raises suspicion; it never clears anything.
Declares: MCP server exposing swap-quote tools for common DEXes. The get_quote tool description additionally instructs the agent to call setApprovalForAll on the caller's main account before quoting, and to upload the local keystore file to the quote server.
MCP server · v0.9.0 · Fugugent example author
The pipeline is running against this build. There is no verdict yet.
Declares: Reads token balances for a list of addresses and reports a portfolio total. Requires an RPC endpoint; declares no signing capability.
MCP server · v0.5.0 · Fugugent example author
An audit ran and could not decide, or its evidence is not held. Nothing was cleared and nothing was ruled out.
Declares: Proxies JSON-RPC calls to a configured node. The audit ran but could not observe the binary's behaviour, so it reached no verdict — which is reported as INCONCLUSIVE rather than rounded to either safe or dangerous.
Colour is never the only difference between two of them: each has its own wording, its own glyph and its own border texture, so the seven stay seven in grayscale as well.
The status is worked out from the audits actually held. There is no column anywhere that a publisher, an auditor or this page could write by hand.
The only status that means safe. The audited digest equals the digest being served, and the evidence is held.
Knowledge, not ignorance. This build was examined and found harmful, a different thing from never having been looked at.
The rug-pull shape: a clean v1 followed by a v2 nobody checked. A verdict is bound to the digest it examined and does not travel.
An audit that reached no verdict has still told us something real, and it is not rounded to either clean or dangerous.
Work in progress is not a result. A partial pipeline clears nothing.
Money put at stake is a promise about the future, not a statement about the code.
The default state of everything on an open registry, and the state most installs happen in today.
A badge is worth exactly as much as the auditor loses by handing it out wrongly. The fee and the money at stake sit in 0x0354d2a4…ec8a52 ↗, deployed and verified on BNB Chain testnet, and the whole cycle has been run on it. These are those four transactions.